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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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The Operational Planner and War Termination

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Ricki Lynn Sullivan

Major, United States Army

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Major Ricki Lynn Sullivan, United States Army

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Abstract of
WAR TERMINATION AND THE OPERATIONAL PLANNER

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PREFACE

A subject such as war termination could fill volumes of books and still not cover all the details. This paper was written with several assumptions in mind in order to reduce the scope of the subject. The paper was written from a national, mid-intensity level of war perspective. Such factors as time for planning and international concerns were not addressed, though one could easily see the importance of these issues to the topic. The reader should note the extensive use of quotes and paraphrases from other authors at the beginning of the paper was deemed necessary in order to lay a solid foundation for the subject. While original thought on the matter of war termination may be hard to come by, the application and interpretation of war termination issues lends itself to a high degree of subjectivity, particularly at the operational level.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Carl von Clausewitz stated that "To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the commander-in-chief is simultaneously a statesman."[1] B.H. Liddell Hart seemed to agree when he stated "The object in war is a better state of peace, even if only from your own point of view. Hence, it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."[2] Despite the advice of two well-known military theorists and strategists, war termination remains a weak link in the campaign and operational planning process.

This paper will address the complex issue of war termination and in the end provide the operational planner with a starting point for encompassing the various elements of war termination into the operational planning process. It will not provide the operational planner with a formula or model in which data can be put in and approved solutions to military planning pulled out. Rather, by showing the importance of war termination, I hope to raise the military planners awareness of war termination issues in the initial phases of planning, while laying the groundwork for a long-term change in the way we currently plan for war.

I have chosen to divide this paper into six chapters, with the first chapter being the introduction. Chapter II will offer a definition of war termination, discuss its components and known

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obligations, and provide the reader with thoughts concerning the importance and complexity of this subject. To do this, I will rely heavily on the existing thoughts of military theorists and strategist who have studied and written on war termination. $\vdash_\prime$ examining the thoughts of Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and others, I believe the reader will develop a greater appreciation for the subject matter.

Chapter III of this paper will briefly outline current military doctrine concerning war termination and outline the current national military strategic estimate and the campaign plan format. Chapter IV will examine a rational model for conflict termination produced by COL Bruce Clarke of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. The national military strategic estimate and the conflict termination model look at war termination at the national and strategic levels, respectively, and serve as a starting point in the construction of war termination planning at the operational level. In Chapter V, I present my views on how, what, and when operational planners should consider war termination issues. And finally, Chapter VI I will provide the reader with my concluding remarks.

The perceived notion of war termination conjures up images of bureaucrats pouring tediously over administrative details, the battles long since over, the war long since won. War termination, peace negotiations, and peace treaties are often lumped together as "things politicians do", the military having done its part by "securing the victory". Discussing battles, strategies, military

personalities, and high-technology weapons is far more interesting than treaties, post-war policies, or the re-building of a shattered government.   But wars do not necessarily end when military objectives have been obtained.   If we accept Clausewitz's definition that war is a political act, then it seems fair to assume a war can truly "end" only when a political solution, as well as a military one, has been achieved.[3]

CHAPTER II

WAR TERMINATION: DEFINITION, IMPORTANCE, AND DIFFICULTIES

To understand war termination, we must first define war. Clausewitz said "War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."[1] Further defining war, Clausewitz believed that "war is only a branch of political activity, that it is in no sense autonomous."[2] The phrase "carried on with other means" is generally accepted to mean fight with ones armed forces. Thus, war has a military and political element. To put it another way, war is a political tool that carries out its political policies through its military element. Politics, for the purposes of this definition, includes a myriad of subunits such as economic, humanitarian, psychological, etc.

If war then is composed of a political and military element it follows that war termination must include military and political objectives and actions to secure national policies for which a state of war was declared and fought. Under these premises then, I offer the following definition for war termination:

> The achievement of those actions and objectives, both political and military, necessary to secure national policy aims, lead to the conclusion of hostilities, and return to peace/normal political relations among warring nations.

War in itself does not suspend political intercourse. Even as fighting rages political relations between nations and their peoples continues. The means used to carry out political relations

in war is different, but military actions progress and/or are restricted along political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.[3] Should a nation try to divorce war from it political nature into a purely military action, "we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense."[4]

Libraries are filled with books that scrutinize the causes, participants, and strategies use to fight a war. However, few publications can be found discussing the termination aspects of conflict. Yet the importance of why a war began often pales in comparison to the significance of its ending, both militarily and politically. The difficult nature of the war ending process may create or increase the strains on which future conflicts are based.[5] The "ending" of World War I, for example, had a direct influence on the start of World War II.

There are legal requirements that exist in the war termination process. International law, for example, requires that the victor in a war must undertake specific responsibilities toward the people of a defeated nation, primarily by ensuring basic functions or services necessary to sustain the population exist.[6] If a nation is perceived to be "playing by the rules" of international law, it is quite possible that the strains of ending a conflict mentioned above might be reduced as well.

Why is war termination so difficult? The reasons are many. "Now, where do I want to be when this is over?" A correct answer to this simple question would eliminate most of the problems associated with war termination. However, as we will see, the

answer is extremely complex. Because of the way we plan today, military plans are of little use in answering this question, as most military strategic plans are open-ended.[7] They allow for the movement of forces to theater and for the opening battles, but they do not address the desired goal of the conflict in terms that define war termination objectives.[8]

The war ending process often lacks order and coherence. The "war may have multiple endings, ending at different times for different participants. While the military contest may have a finite ending, the political, social, and psychological issues may not be resolved even years after the formal end of hostilities."[9] Civilian leaders may order the initiation of a military operation without a plan for bringing the war to a close. Since war plans often only cover the first act of a conflict, the national leadership, while weighing the risks and costs of avoiding conflict against the dangers and possible gains of war, may be choosing a plan without an ending.[10]

It is often assumed that nations, in pursuit of post-war objectives, have a plan that links its entire war effort to some well-articulated war aim. Rarely is this the case however, for the agencies and individuals that help shape national policies usually have divergent interest. Initially, military goals and strategies will rule supreme, but as the war begins to end, political, social, and moral considerations will become paramount.[11] Additionally, nations tend to seek peace settlements that will ensure a greater and more lasting security than existed before the conflict. As

such, governments usually make more stringent demands of a settlement in ending a war than they imposed upon the relationship in peace.[*]

The difficulties associated with war termination will most likely be exasperated when our forces fight as part of a coalition, whether ad hoc or formal. Trying to predict the end-state of a conflict through the eyes of a coalition will be exponentially harder than doing so from a national point of view. Various governments will have different political aims, military opinions, and must answer to a diverse domestic populations.

While most nations may have agreed it was a good idea to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait during the Gulf War, how, when, and to what extent could have easily become points of contention among coalition members. War termination from the coalition perspective is another research paper unto itself. Suffice to say however, the thought processes and questions of war termination at the national level would parallel those at the international level. The degree of complexity at the international level, however, would be significantly increased.

War termination goals may not always be defined precisely before a war begins and may likely shift during the course of the

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[*]These thoughts are a paraphrase of Fred Ikle's views, except as noted. Ikle is considered to be one of the foremost experts on war termination. <u>Every War Must End</u>, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 2-14.

conflict.* Moving from an era of global nuclear threats to an age of limited war, nations may prefer a less costly political compromise to a conflict rather than commit to a decisive military victory. Thus, success on the battlefield cannot necessarily guarantee the post-war attainment of desired political or economic objectives. War endings then cannot be restricted to an analysis of military performance or strategy.

When politicians and diplomats decide the political situations are so degraded that war is a must, military leaders come to command a vastly increased segment of national resources. At this point, the primary concern on both sides will be military efforts, the vast majority of political elements will lay dormant for a time. Once the military is unleashed it must be allowed to perform its mission. By their nature, military leaders can impeded war termination. Most military men/women have ingrained in them the idea of completing assigned tasks successfully, expect the authority to maintain control of any situation, and often lack the necessary insight of political problems.[12] Likewise, "once American forces have been engaged in combat, and American lives lost, the bases for ending a war have changed drastically from what they were before the fight began."[13]

In fighting wars, "most of the exertion is devoted to the means, perfecting the military instrument and deciding on their use

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*Stuart Albert and Edward Luck develop this idea in a book they edit which contains several essays on the subject of ending wars. On the Endings of War, (Port Washington, NY: Kennica Press Corporation, 1980), pp.3-5.

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in battle....far too little is left for relating these means to their ends." Fred Ikle contends that "a degree of intellectual difficulty exists in connecting military plans with their ultimate purpose....governments tend to lose sight of the ending of wars and the nation's interests that lie beyond it, precisely because fighting a war is an effort of such vast magnitude." Military commanders and planners often lose sight of the desired outcome of the war, not a battle or a campaign, but for the true purpose for which they have been called upon to fight. Blind to his calling, the military man skillfully plans intricate operations and coordinates complicated maneuvers, while failing to perceive the political or diplomatic outcomes for which a war was fought. Likewise, government leaders, entrusted to arrive at the broader political judgments, are often "insufficiently conversant with the hard facts of the military domain."[*]

Liddell-Hart once said "It is the responsibility of statesmanship never to lose sight of the post-war prospect in chasing the 'mirage of victory'."[14] Historically, the preponderance of thinking about war has been done by the military professional. Military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy. The career statesmen/women have tended to lose sight of the basic national object, that is our policies and goals, and identify it with the military aim in

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[*]Ikle's thoughts, paraphrased in this paragraph, faults both military and civilian leaders for poor war termination execution. Every War Must End, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 1-18.

periods of crisis.   Consequently, the military aim has all to
often become the national policy--an end in itself, instead of as
merely a means to the end.[15]

CHAPTER III

WAR TERMINATION AND CURRENT US DOCTRINE

The concept of war termination is not foreign to US military doctrine, it is just woefully underdeveloped. Joint Pub 0-1, Basic National Defense Doctrine, does not define "war termination" but does define termination objectives as "Specific objectives which define the intended manner of conflict termination and the required military and diplomatic achievements to obtain it."[1] War termination, as a phase of conflict planning, is not currently a part of this doctrine.

A review of the overlapping levels of war seems appropriate before a review of our current doctrine. A basic understanding of the levels of war provides a clearer view of the need to incorporate war termination thinking and planning down to the operational level.

The levels of war form a complementary yet complex relationship. Political leaders must identify national objectives and devise a national strategy that will accomplish stated objectives. Within the military strategy component of the national strategy, strategic military objectives are conceived. Strategic objectives are then assigned to a theater of operation, where the objectives become the responsibility of the theater commander-in-chief (CINC). Generally speaking, the operational level of war requires a theater perspective.

Strategic level commanders and planners consider the use of

elements of power, economic, political, technological, psychological, and military. Strategic guidance is a derivative of domestic and international policies. It is strategic guidance that links national alliance aims to the operational level of war. Strategy provides the operational commander the framework from which he will operate by establishing strategic objectives, allocating resources, and providing strategic concepts and/or constraints. Simply put, it is strategy that provides the fundamental guidelines for war or deterrence.

The theater CINC, or operational commander, must now develop his theater military strategy in order to achieve assigned strategic objectives. To do this, the operational commander must select objectives, define concepts, and develop an operational strategy which outlines the way given resources will be utilized to ensure strategic objectives are met. Unlike the strategic planners, the operational commander focuses increasingly on the military aspects of planning, but not entirely. Thus, the interface between the strategic and operational level takes national aims or goals (strategic) and translates them into very broad and general military terms (operational).

The operational commander must now reduce the focus of strategic objectives to a series of events that will ensure success in attaining assigned strategic objectives. At the operational level, this is generally done through the mechanism of the campaign plan. Campaign plans are the operational commander's broad concept of operations, the mechanism by which he relays to subordinate

commanders how he intends to accomplish given objectives. Once operational objectives are determined, the achievement of those objectives should lead to strategic success.

At the national-strategic level we find war termination discussed, properly I believe, in very broad terms. Appendix B, Joint Pub 0-1, outlines the Estimate of the National Military Strategic Situation.* Based on the traditional military estimate of the situation, this estimate is constructed to provide "a running strategic estimate and framework for national military strategic advice..."[2]

Noteworthy for the purpose of this paper are two paragraphs. Paragraph 1, National Objective Analysis, poses some fundamental questions that form the foundation of war termination. Four such questions related to war termination follow:

(1) What has changed internationally to create the problem?

(2) What US interests are at stake (short term, long term)?

(3) What are the political and economic possibilities and consequences of military action and inaction? and,

(4) What international and domestic law provisions bear? What international organizations have a stake in this?[3]

Likewise, paragraph 1(c)(2), Political and Military Objectives, provides our first reference to war termination at the

*See Appendix A for the entire version of Appendix B, JCS Pub 0-1.

national level.   The more important questions posed in this
paragraph are:

> (1) What political and military objectives have been
> established by the President (declared, undeclared,
> unknown)?
>
> (2) What is the _central political aim_--the ultimate
> effect desired, that final state between the parties to
> the conflict in the aftermath that best serves US
> interests?
>
> (3) What domestic and international commitments have the
> President made which are defacto _contributory political
> objectives_? and,
>
> (4) Given a _central political aim_ and the _contributory
> political objectives_ either stated or deduced, what
> _termination objectives_ (ultimately military and
> diplomatic achievements) suggest themselves?[4]

The questions in this estimate, when answered, will outline
national guidance for the strategic planners.   The national
military strategic situation estimate provides the political fiber
that must be woven through the planning process from the national
down to the operational level.   Clearly focused on broader aims
than just military, this estimate in my opinion, correctly and
sufficiently, raises the questions and issues of war termination
necessary for the national level.   As the strategic planners begin
to translate national aims into strategic guidance for the
operational planners, a noticeable problem arises in the form of

service doctrines for the land components, the Army and the Marine Corps.

A review of the Army's FM 100-5, Operations, finds no direct reference to war termination and one would have to severely stretch their imagination to produce indirect references to the same. The focus of FM 100-5 is purely on the military aspects of war operations, no focus is diverted to the political side. The manual defines operational art in a military flavor only, clearly deficient of the political, economic, and other factors that affect the operational and other levels of war.[5] Only marginally better, the US Marine Corps doctrine recognizes the need to "determine the desired end state, the military conditions we must realize in order to reach that destination."[6] But guidelines needed to develop the desired end-state are non-existent.

It is distressing that the doctrines of the two land components of the armed forces gloss over war termination. Neither service doctrine suggest principles on which war termination concepts are integrated into the strategic-campaign planning process.[7] In doing so, these services fail to provide the necessary guidance or planning framework for their planners to relate military conditions not only to the totality of strategic objectives (political and military), but indirectly to the national changes (political) that lie at the root of conflict. The lack of political presence in these doctrines, and thus in lower planning documents, creates a dangerous gap in the war termination process. Ultimately, these discrepancies will make their way back into the

political arena, usually in the form an unfinished war or the beginning of another conflict.

The campaign plan format, Appendix C , Joint Pub 3-0, <u>Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations</u>, provides the operational commander with the strategic concept of operations and guidance.[*] It is here that the operational commander must translate given considerations into a campaign plan. As with the doctrines of the Army and Marine Corps, the current campaign plan format is without a political element for war termination. Understanding the conditions our political leaders desire the military forces to created before a military campaign is executed is paramount. So how do we fix the discrepancies noted in our doctrine and campaign planning format?

Studying historical and recent conflicts in the light of their endings is the first step to correcting our war termination deficiencies. This should be done by our policy makers and our military leadership. Education in this area will dictate doctrinal changes, as the importance of war termination will quickly become apparent to those who study and view war in its generic state, a continuation of national political policy.

However, a more timely solution to the campaign plan format can be resolved if we in the military recognize and accept the need to think and plan more in "the political" realm, while simultaneously incorporating that thinking into our current

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[*]See Appendix B for a complete outline of the Campaign Plan format.

military planning process. A small modification to the campaign format could take care of our war termination planning problems. But the crafting of this modification requires a solid, logical, methodology that can identify, in unambiguous terms, operational aims that support strategic and national political objectives as well as military ones. Fortunately, the education and development of a methodology received a big boost in what I will refer to as the "Clarke Model".

CHAPTER IV

THE CLARKE MODEL

COL Bruce B.G. Clarke of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, has recently developed what he calls a rational model for conflict termination.* Clarke attempts to develop a model that allows a person to categorize where he is in the development of a conflict. The thrust of his report is the need to determine how to induce either the leader or some chosen political group in the enemy's government to want to change that nation's objectives so that the source of the conflict is eliminated, then take actions that cause that faction to have both the desire and ability to cause that change in objectives to occur. He suggests that victory will result from the successful defense of one's own political and military centers of gravity combined with actions that threaten the enemy's center of gravity, with the result being that the enemy changes his objective. Clarke concludes with a decisionmaking approach that establishes, and then seeks to achieve what he calls "victory criteria". The key to the Clarke model is the development of three critical pieces of guidance:

  1. A clear statement by the political authorities of the
  desired situation in the post-hostility and settlement
  phases--a vision of what the area should "look like"

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*COL Bruce Clarke, Director of US National Security Studies at the Army War College, wrote a report analyzing sources and the nature of disputes of conflicts. In his reports he develops a rational model of planners to use when considering war termination. Conflict Termination, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), pp. 26-27.

following the hostilities.

2. A clear set of political objectives that when achieved will allow the above vision to become reality.

3. A set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow/cause the above to happen.[1]

He contends that to achieve our objectives in a dispute

> we must do a clear analysis of both our own and our opponent's centers of gravity. We must properly identify them so as to attack both an opponent's political and military centers of gravity and thus, at least indirectly, channel our efforts against the internal political entity that will have the power, as the dispute/conflict unfold, to change the opponents objectives. Knowing that 'victory' will result when the opponent changes his objectives to accommodate ours, we need to establish a minimum acceptable set of performance criteria that we expect the adversary to meet. These will become our 'victory criteria'."[2]

His analytical process for the conflict termination model is presented here:

1. Define the problem.

2. Define 'settlement'/post conflict situation (strategic vision).

3. Analyze courses of action.

4. Select a course of action that will achieve the "victory criteria" within the upper limits of power that have been decided upon.

5. Synchronize that courses of action selected from the above analysis.

6. Execute the plan/strategy.

7. Evaluate to determine if the plan is unfolding as envisioned.

8. Based on the evaluation either return to step 2 or if 'victory' has been achieved then proceed to:

9. Execute the post-hostility political process planned for in steps 4 and 5. As a result of this process

one will either proceed to the last step or start over again in the analytical process.

10.   Settlement.[3]

Clarke has effectively bridged the gap between the national and strategic levels of in the sense of war termination with his model and thought processes. While some of the same thoughts can be used at the strategic-operational level, I believe we must now reduce the process one more level for the operational planner to incorporate war termination measures effectively. If Clarke's model is followed at the strategic level, the strategic guidance produced and passed down to the operational commander will provide a more detailed overview of both political and military necessities for planning purposes. Clearer guidance from higher command allows the lower level commander to increase the detail planning at his level.

CHAPTER V

WAR TERMINATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

In the case of war termination at the operational level, the planning should be directed at those activities that begin the transition from military control to political/civilian control. Like a campaign plan, the process should be a phased process, with more detailed guidance evolving as the transition phase becomes more civilian dominated. Is the war termination phase of campaign planning really necessary? Yes, for the reasons already stated plus another reason that merits some attention.

A war is being fought to further a political aim. As the political element cannot be stripped out of the conduct of war, neither can the political element be stripped from the planning process at the operational level without significant and negative results. If we accept the premise that the end-state has political and military elements, it can be deduced that the political elements could influence that military elements and vice versa. Therefore, the planning process should focus on the requirement of both at the lowest level of planning possible. If during the planning process it becomes apparent, for example, that a military objective could unduly interfere with a stated or deduced political objective, and thus the end-state, then quite possibly the military objective could be modified before the operation or fighting begins.

In the planning for Desert Storm, the air staff developed a

considerable list of specific objectives to be bombed, including

key electrical grids and oil storage facilities. While certainly

a legitimate military objective, politically there were problems.

John Fishel provides insight to this electrical grid problem from

the recent Gulf War:

> "The process of turning strategy into orders for execution
> demonstrates some of the difficulties of retaining both the
> strategic focus as well as key political-military
> inconsistencies. As an example, one should consider the
> targeting of the Iraqi electrical grid. Clearly, this was a
> military target whose destruction had numerous military pay-
> offs. As the same time, destruction of the Iraqi electrical
> system would create significant hardship for the civilian
> population including the potential for many deaths....This
> concept for attacking the electrical grid rested on the
> assumptions of a short war. If the assumption were valid then
> the proper way of targeting was that which would put the
> system out of action but capable of being repaired in a
> relatively short time. This approach would cause the fewest
> residual civilian casualties in Iraq and, therefore, the least
> amount of animosity toward the US and its allies. Instead the
> targeters ignored the civil-military/political-military
> implications of their targeting and assigned those targets
> which would put the system out of operation for the longest
> possible period."[1]

To help reduce problems like the one above, I propose a war

termination phase be incorporated into the current campaign plan

format (Appendix C, Joint Pub 0-1) and a war termination annex be

added as well. My vision for the war termination annex is

presented in Appendix E. As stated earlier, this is not a

comprehensive check list for war termination planning. When

applied in concert with the discussion of this paper, it should

provide operational planners with a workable and logical format for

the planning and execution of the termination phase of a war.

The war termination phase sub-paragraph would be added into

the campaign plan format at paragraph three, Strategic Concept (See

Appendix D). Like other phases of a campaign plan, the operational commander could give broad guidance on the subject matter in the campaign plan format, and present more specific guidance in the war termination annex.

The first paragraph of the war termination annex would outline stated and implied war termination guidance, objectives, and actions from higher authorities. This paragraph is designed to help military planners remain cognizant of the political factors relevant to the conflict. It should consist of a restatement of strategic objectives plus additional instructions desired from the operational commander.

The next paragraph of this annex focuses on the enemy's military forces during the post-hostility and post-war phases of a war. The disposition of enemy soldiers and their leaders after a war deserves careful consideration from operational planners. In Operation Just Cause, defeated Panamanian troops were quickly won over to the United States cause and were just as quickly put back to work in the war's aftermath. This move enhanced the United States' role as a "peace keeper" and help muffle claims that we were an aggressive bully.

All parts of the annex might not be used in a conflict. War crimes investigations and re-structure of a country's military command will not be used in all cases. On the other hand, planning for enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) will always be a consideration. By placing EPWs as a separate consideration in the war termination annex however, a greater emphasis is placed on the logistical

support required to conduct the necessary operations for EPWs under international laws and conventions.

The transfer of post-hostility and post-war actions to civilian agencies is an effective way to help phase the military out of a conflict and phase control of these actions to civilian or perhaps a neutral party such as a United Nations force. The concept here for military planners is to force them to look ahead and coordinate outside of military channels with agencies that can provide assistance and expertise in areas unfamiliar to military forces.

The third part of the war termination annex parallels those of enemy's military forces, except now the civilian populace is considered. Medical, food, and shelter requirements are mentioned to bring a greater awareness to the logistical support necessary to carry out humanitarian assistance immediately following a conflict. Disposition of political and police forces is a major point to that should be dealt with as soon as possible. Incorporating local and state leaders back into the post-war activities should expedite civilian control of a country and help settle any uneasiness of its people.

Unique to the civilian population paragraph in the war termination annex is the planning for public services. Assuming destruction was unavoidable to water, electric, and communication facilities, the defeated nation might require substantial help in returning these basic services to an operational condition. Military planners could expedite the process by being aware of such

needs and while military forces would unlikely have the expertise or the resources to completely rebuild or repair an electric plant for example, they could provide the initial coordination between the defeated country and civilian agencies that could provide such services.

The war termination annex should not be conceived as an outline on how the military can rebuild a defeated nation. Rather, it is a guide for military planners to consider tasks that military unit will or possibly get called on to perform. Keep in mind, if this planning is done correctly before a military operation begins, potential problem areas between planned operations and war termination goals can be reconsidered and operational objectives modified prior to any fighting. By forcing military planners to think through an operation and plan as best they can for the aftermath prior to the conflict, we can hopefully maximize the combat potential of our forces, minimize any deviation from out political aims, and enhance the war termination process.

Some of the issues found in the war termination annex will seem familiar to those with combat experience or those that have worked on division and higher staffs. But the war termination annex formalizes the planning for these issues where as in the past, most of the issues found in this annex were afterthoughts. Placing war termination considerations on the planning table during the planning of an operation elevate the importance of the subject and can lead to an easier post-hostility and post-war transition period.

The war termination annex proposed in Appendix E attempts to draw the critical elements of war termination thought from Clausewitz, Ikle, Liddell Hart, and others into a logical and workable format at the campaign level of war. Another annex, war termination model, or thought process would only serve to further confuse the planning process unless it is constructed for a specific, usable purpose. As the operational planners have grappled with the guidance and objectives handed down to them, they must now plan not only to meet those objectives, but translate operational objectives down to tactical missions for the fighters. Thus, while political guidance must be incorporated into the thinking and planning, the end product has a distinct mission-oriented, tactical look to it.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

When the Cold War ended, the United States shifted to a regional conflict national defense strategy. As our enemy for the last forty-five years suddenly collapsed, we found ourselves without one "big" enemy but now with many "smaller" potential enemies. The chances for our nation to use military forces in a number of countries for numerous reasons over the entire spectrum of conflict has increased now that we remain the lone "superpower" of the world. At the same time, the United States military continues to rapidly draw down its forces as a part of its restructuring efforts in order to contend with the new regional strategy.

While the chances for a global war are diminished for the present, the probability of sending military forces into a regional, mid-intensity conflict are greater than they have been for quite some time. The political and military leaders of this country must ensure the use of military power is both necessary and extremely well-defined before committing armed forces, more so now than ever before. Again I emphasize that the end-state of a potential conflict must be thought through **before** we commit our military, not after the fighting has begun.

War termination, as we have defined and discussed in this paper, does and indeed must take on additional significance in our present and future planning for war. "A battle won should count on the plus side only if it fits into a larger design for ending the

war on favorable terms...."[2] says Fred Ikle. From a practical sense, he is correct. With military resources becoming more limited every day, we must ensure the utilization of such assets brings significant returns when called upon. A clear understanding of the end-state desired will allow military planners to focus their attentions on planning that will hasten the end of a conflict with little wasted effort or assets.

Appendix A

ESTIMATE OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC SITUATION*

1. <u>National Objective Analysis</u>

    a. <u>Overview of the Fundamental Problem</u>. Coordinate with OSD, Department of State (DOS), NSC staff, intelligence community as required.

        (1) What has changed internationally to create the problem?

        (2) What US interests are at stake (short term, long term)?

        (3) What reinforcing or conflicting interest of other nations bear on the problem and US response?

        (4) What are the political and economic possibilities and consequences of military action and inaction?

        (5) What international and domestic law provisions bear? What international organizations have a stake in this?

        (6) What else is going on world-wide which may influence what we or other parties to the problem can or cannot do (e.g., other crises, potential crises, alliance commitments)?

        (7) Are there strategic limitations (e.g., reach, endurance, timing) which effect what we or other parties to the problem can or cannot do?

        (8) Assessment of public mood domestically, regionally, and worldwide.

    b. <u>Estimate of the Relevant Military Situation</u>. Coordinate with unified/specified commanders, Services, intelligence community, OSD, others as required.

        (1) <u>Enemy Situation</u>

            (a) Broad military strategic courses of action being taken and available in the future (i.e., capabilities).

            (b) To the degree that they are known, enemy

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*Source: Joint Pub 0-1 (Proposed Final Pub), <u>Basic National Defense Doctrine</u>, (Washington: 1991), pp. B-1-B-14.

political and military intentions.

(c) Strategic military advantages (e.g.,
initiative, position) and limitations (e.g.,
endurance, reach).

(d) Possibilities for external military support
(forces, material, psychological efforts).

(e) Possibilities of internal political or military
disruption (coup, insurgency, strikes, etc.).

(f) Identification of strategic center(s) of
gravity.

(2) Friendly Situation

(a) Broad military strategic courses of action
available (i.e. capabilities).

(b) Military strategic advantages and limitations.

(c) Possibilities for foreign military support.

(d) Possibilities of domestic political or military
disruption (political, media, terrorist, etc.).

(e) Identification of own strategic center(s) of
gravity.

(3) Environmental Situation. The influence of
geography, weather, the economy, and the elapse of
time on friendly and enemy military capabilities.
Also, consider the influence of and advantages to
strategic by-standers not directly a party to the
crisis.

(4) Conclusions Regarding Decisive Differentials.
Vulnerabilities or correlative military power
differentials which significantly influence our
strategic possibilities.

c. Political and Military Objectives. Coordinate with OSD,
NSC staff, others.

(1) What political and military objectives have been
established by the President (declared, undeclared,
unknown)?

(2) What is the central political aim--the ultimate
effect desired, that final state between the parties to
the conflict in the aftermath that best serves US

interests?

(3) What domestic and international commitments have the President made which are defacto <u>contributory political objectives</u>?

(4) Given a <u>central political aim</u> and the <u>contributory political objectives</u> either stated or deduced, what <u>termination objectives</u> (ultimately military and diplomatic achievements) suggest themselves?

(a) <u>Imposed Termination</u>

1. <u>Alternative Military Objectives</u>. The physical or territorial goals the control or disruption of which, when politically exploited, will provide a basis for realizing the political aim. Each alternative should be adequate, feasible, and acceptable.

2. <u>Contributory Diplomatic Objectives</u>. Those diplomatic efforts necessary to establish and coordinate coalition military action, obtain host nation support, and establish post conflict regional stability.

(b) <u>Negotiated Termination</u>

1. <u>Alternative Diplomatic Objectives</u>. The objective international agreements which provide a basis for realizing the political aim.

2. <u>Contributory Military Objectives</u>. The physical or territorial goals the control or destruction of which--or threat thereof--will provide a basis for negotiating attainment of the political aim. Each alternative should be adequate, feasible, and acceptable.

(c) Often times it is unknown at the outset whether conflict termination will be through an imposed or negotiated settlement. Accordingly, military strategy and commanders may have to be prepared to go either way, at least during the initial phase(s).

d. <u>Analysis of Political and Military Objectives</u>

(1) Based on what is known, analyze political and military objectives, both <u>specified</u> and <u>deduced</u>, for their relationship, adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability.

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(a) Specified objectives are established by higher authority.

(b) Deduced objectives are just that: unspecified but clearly necessary objectives militated by: (1) the situation as it unfolds beyond the parameters of the specified objectives, or (2) the need for an intermediate achievement contributing to the specified objectives.

(c) This analysis and derivation of deduced military objectives is routine throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. However, as the strategic level it is also useful to analyze political objectives and to deduce those political objectives (e.g., nature of conflict termination) which are unspecified by which clearly bear on the strategic situation. These should be tagged as political assumptions and serve as basis for interagency coordination and dialogue with the NCA to clarify US political objectives. They should also serve to cross check military objectives and military restrictions (e.g., rules of engagement).

(2) Analysis of Military Objectives. Comparison of all alternatives for impose and negotiated termination possibilities considering:

(a) Enemy military capabilities and potential for international reinforcement.

(b) Estimated force requirement and force buildup curve over time.

(c) Estimated time to achieve the military objective (at least order of magnitude: hours-days, days-weeks, weeks-months, months-years).

(d) Estimated casualties (friendly, enemy, civilian).

(e) Impact on domestic situation (e.g., mobilization requirements).

(f) Impact on worldwide military responsibilities.

(g) Estimated time and resources to return US military posture to the status quo ante bellum.

(h) Estimate of transportation, logistics, and mobilization supportability (1) for US forces and

(2) such coalition forces as we politically agree to support. This should include infrastructure and industrial readiness to support contingency operations as well as peacetime operations at home and abroad.

e. Recommended Military Termination Objective(s). The on (preferably) or several simplest conceptual descriptions of the military achievements which--from the military perspective--supports the political aim within the limitations of military capabilities which can be brought to bear over time. NCA decision on this point provides the focus for subsequent military strategy development and military strategic advice. Bear in mind that, over time, political and military objectives may change

f. Recommended Military Restrictions. Those limitations to the use/threat of use of force which, from a military perspective, are necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements associated diplomatic efforts, and domestic/foreign popular support.

2. National Military Strategic Issues. Section I focused on what to do and why (objectives); Section II orients on how (strategy). The "issues" approach focuses military strategic advice, analysis, and coordination on the military considerations which require NCA decision. These decisions provide the framework for the national military strategy in response to the crisis. While each issue together with the alternative courses of action, their advantages, disadvantages, and recommendation is summarized herein, it may be developed and coordinated in a separate staff study or staff estimate.

a. What Should Be Our Overall Military Strategy Concept?

(1) This should describe and analyze the available strategic course of action against enemy capabilities and among themselves. Generally, each description should outline:

(a) Major strategic tasks to be accomplished in the order or phases in which they are to be accomplished. Identify theater of main effort (at least for the first phase) in a multi-theater strategy.

(b) Forces required (time-phased requirements of active, reserve, and international forces).

(c) General logistic concept.

(d) General deployment concept (forces and

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logistics).

(e) Estimate of time required to reach termination objective(s).

(f) Concept for maintaining a national strategic reserve.

(2) This may be prepared as a separate staff study based on commander estimates, extant plans, and the political and military objectives selected for crisis resolution.

b. What Adjustments are Required for Military Strategic Direction?

(1) What adjustments to the US combatant command structure are required at the outset? Over time?

(2) If an international military effort, can we establis unified (i.e., combined) command or only command coordination (e.g., coalition operations)? What are the politically and militarily feasible options for command relationships?

(3) What are the options for coordinating diplomatic, intelligence, and military effort in the area(s) of operations? With the host nation(s)? With other participating nations?

c. What Should Be Our Concept for Force Buildup in the Objective Area(s)?

(1) What shifts of forces among combatant commanders are required?

(2) What reserve forces are required when and where? What call-up authorities are required?

(3) What numbers and type of combatant capabilities beyond extant active and reserve forces are required and when? What are the Service capabilities to generate these additional forces over time?

(4) What adjustments to force buildup and military strategy are necessary until a functioning logistic pipeline is established and industrial production meets resupply demands?

d. What Should Be Our Strategic Logistic Concept?

(1) If an international effort, what are the national responsibilities for providing and coordinating logistic support? What is the impact on combined/coalition operations and US operations along the time line? What are the international priorities? Who coordinates what?

(2) What should be our mobilization concept? What are the priorities for mobilization of reserve forces, manpower, skills, and industrial support? At what point do we require the draft? At what point must we declare a national emergency? Expansion of industrial and agricultural production and increased exploitation of foreign sources? Expansion of military infrastructure and increased exploitation of national infrastructure?

(3) What are the priorities for Military Department generation of replacements, resupply, and additional forces?

(4) What are the priorities for mobilization of strategic transportation resources? Is international augmentation required?

(5) What are the priorities among theaters (and nations) for strategic transportation support?

(6) What fiscal authorities are required to do all this?

e. What is the Strategic Intelligence Concept? What are the priorities for national intelligence requirements and requirements for national intelligence support to combatant commands?

f. What are the Military Implications of a Declaration of War? While the decision for a policy of war or military operations short of war will be made primarily on political ground, that decision should consider the resultant strategic military ramifications. For military operations short of war, one consideration is the War Posers Resolution and its possible impact on military operations longer that 90 days.

g. What is the Military Role in the Aftermath? Will there be requirements for military civic action, military government, or a military peacekeeping effort? What is the executive department (State. DoD, Commerce, FEMA, etc.) division of work for implementing the peace and who (e.g. ambassador, special commissioner, theater commander) is the overall authority for its coordination?

Appendix B

Campaign Plan Format*

Security Classification

THEATER OF WAR CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Briefly describe the command organization for the campaign. Detailed information may be included in the command relationships annex.

1.   Situation.   Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses (see theater or commander's estimate). The related CONPLAN or OPLAN should be identified as appropriate.

   a.   Strategic Guidance.   Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memorandums, and strategic plans, including a global campaign plan received from higher elements.

      (1) Relate the strategic direction to the theater of war requirements in its global, regional, and space elements.

      (2) List the strategic objectives and tasks assigned to the command.

      (3) Constraints--List actions that are prohibited or require higher authority.

   b. Enemy Forces. Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence data including information on the following:

      (1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of major enemy forces that can influence action in the theater of war.

      (2) Strategic concept, should include enemy's perception of friendly vulnerabilities and enemy's intentions

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*Source: Joint Pub 3-0 (Proposed Final Pub), Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington: 1990), pp. C-1-C-5.

regarding those vulnerabilities.

    (3) Major objectives (strategic and operational).

    (4) Commander's idiosyncracies and doctrinal patterns.

    (5) Operational an sustainment capabilities.

    (6) Vulnerabilities.

    (7) Strategic centers of gravity.

  c. **Friendly Forces**. State here information on friendly forces not assigned that may directly affect the command.

    (1) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands.

    (2) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied or other coalition forces.

  d. **Assumptions**. State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions.

2. **Mission**. State the task(s) of the command and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to achieving the strategic objective(s).

3. **Unified Operations**.

  a. **Strategic Concept**. State the broad concept for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of major forces in the command including the concepts of deception and psychological warfare during the campaign as a whole.

    (1) Theater organization.

    (2) Theater objectives.

    (3) Maneuver (operational).

    (4) Fires (operational).

    (5) Phases of campaign or major operations.

    (6) Timing

  b. **Phase I**.

    (1) Operational Concept. Include operational objectives, scheme of maneuver, and timing for this phase.

(2) Fires. General missions and guidance to subordinates and components. Ensure that fires are complementary.

(3) Forces required by function or capability. Should consider Army, Nay, Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard, special operations and space forces.
(4) Tasks of subordinate commands and components.

(5) Reserve Forces. Location and composition. State "be prepared" missions.

(6) Mobility. Consider: transportation, ports, lines of communication, transit and overflight rights, reinforcement, reception and onward movement, and host-nation support arrangements.

(7) Deception.

(8) Psychological.

c. Phases II-XX. Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each subsequent phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the campaign at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and another significant action initiated.

d. Coordination Instructions. If desired, instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple elements of the command may be placed here.

4. Logistics. Brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the campaign with information and instructions applicable to the campaign by phase. Logistic phases must be concurrent with operational phases. Logistic phases must be concurrent with operational phases. This information may be issued separately and referenced here. At a minimum this paragraph should address:

a. Assumptions

b. Supply aspects.

c. Maintenance and modifications.

d. Medical service.

e. Transportation.

f. Base development.

g. Personnel.

h. Foreign military assistance.

i. Administrative management.

j. Line(s) of communication.

k. Reconstitution of forces.

l. Joint and combined responsibilities.

m. Sustainment priorities and resources.

n. Inter-service responsibilities.

o. Host-nation considerations.

5. **Command and Signal**.

    a. **Command**

        (1) **Command Relationships**. State generally the command relationships for the entire campaign or portions thereof. Indicate any shifts of command contemplated during the campaign, indicating time of the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give location of commander and command posts.

        (2) **Delegation of Authority**.

    b. **Signal**

        (1) **Communications**. Plans of communications. Include time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis of signal communications as appropriate.

        (2) **Electronics**. Plans of electronic systems. Include electronic policy and such other information as required.

(Signed)_____
                          Commander

ANNEXES: As Required
DISTRIBUTION:

Appendix C

<u>The Clarke Model</u>[*]

1. Define the problem.

    What is the nature of the dispute? How important is the dispute to the United State?

    What are both sides' objectives?

    What is "victory"? What are the victory criteria?

    What are the opponent's political and military centers of gravity? What is the U.S. center of gravity?

2. Define "settlement"/post conflict situation (strategic vision).

    What do we want the situation to look like after the conflict phase is completed? What is the nature of the settlement that we seek? and thus relatedly,

    What are the political objectives? and thus relatedly,

    What are the military objectives?

3. Analyze courses of action.

    Lay out options in terms of the elements of power and relate them to the centers of gravity.

    Conduct a cost benefit analysis for each element of power--2nd and 3rd order implications should be considered.

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[*]Source: Bruce Clarke, <u>Conflict Termination: A Rational Model</u> (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), pp. 26-27.

Establish the upper limits on the power to be used. (In other words, one knows how much he is willing to expend in search of a successful out come-Clausewitz's council on limited means for limited ends applies here.)

4. Select a course of action that will achieve the "victory criteria" within the upper limits of power that have been decided upon.

5. Synchronize that courses of action selected from the above analysis.
    Define decision points (conditions) for changing of ends, ways, or means. (Preempt [escalate or intensify], do nothing, quit.)

6. Execute the plan/strategy.

7. Evaluate to determine if the plan is unfolding as envisioned.

8. Based on the evaluation either return to step 2 or if 'victory' has been achieved then proceed to:

9. Execute the post-hostility political process planned for in steps 4 and 5. As a result of this process one will either proceed to the last step or start over again in the analytical process.

10.   Settlement.

Appendix D

Campaign Plan Format
(PROPOSED)
Security Classification

THEATER OF WAR CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Briefly describe the command organization for the campaign. Detailed information may be included in the command relationships annex.

1.   Situation.   Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses (see theater or commander's estimate).   The related CONPLAN or OPLAN should be identified as appropriate.

   a.   Strategic Guidance.   Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memorandums, and strategic plans, including a global campaign plan received from higher elements.

      (1) Relate the strategic direction to the theater of war requirements in its global, regional, and space elements.

      (2) List the strategic objectives and tasks assigned to the command.

      (3) Constraints--List actions that are prohibited or require higher authority.

   b. Enemy Forces. Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence data including information on the following:

      (1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of major enemy forces that can influence action in the theater of war.

      (2) Strategic concept, should include enemy's perception of friendly vulnerabilities and enemy's intentions regarding those vulnerabilities.

      (3) Major objectives (strategic and operational).

(4) Commander's idiosyncracies and doctrinal patterns.

(5) Operational an sustainment capabilities.

(6) Vulnerabilities.

(7) Strategic centers of gravity.

c. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. State here information on friendly forces not assigned that may directly affect the command.

(1) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands.

(2) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied or other coalition forces.

d. <u>Assumptions</u>. State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions.

2. <u>Mission</u>. State the task(s) of the command and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to achieving the strategic objective(s).

3. <u>Unified Operations</u>.

a. <u>Strategic Concept</u>. State the broad concept for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of major forces in the command including the concepts of deception and psychological warfare during the campaign as a whole

(1) Theater organization.

(2) Theater objectives.

(3) Maneuver (operational).

(4) Fires (operational).

(5) Phases of campaign or major operations.

(6) Timing

b. <u>Phase I</u>.

(1) Operational Concept. Include operational objectives, scheme of maneuver, and timing for this phase.

(2) Fires. General missions and guidance to subordinates and components. Ensure that fires are complementary.

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(3)   Forces required by function or capability. Should consider Army, Nay, Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard, special operations and space forces.
(4)   Tasks of subordinate commands and components.

(5)   Reserve Forces. Location and composition. State "be prepared" missions.

(6)   Mobility. Consider: transportation, ports, lines of communication, transit and overflight rights, reinforcement, reception and onward movement, and host-nation support arrangements.

(7)   Deception.

(8)   Psychological.

c.   Phases II-XX.   Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each subsequent phase.   Provide a separate phase for each step in the campaign at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and another significant action initiated.

d.   **War Termination Phase.** See Annex E.

e.   Coordination Instructions.   If desired, instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple elements of the command may be placed here.

4.   Logistics.   Brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the campaign with information and instructions applicable to the campaign by phase.   Logistic phases must be concurrent with operational phases.   Logistic phases must be concurrent with operational phases.   This information may be issued separately and referenced here.   At a minimum this paragraph should address:

a.   Assumptions

b.   Supply aspects.

c.   Maintenance and modifications.

d.   Medical service.

e.   Transportation.

f.   Base development.

g.   Personnel.

h.   Foreign military assistance.

i. Administrative management.

j. Line(s) of communication.

k. Reconstitution of forces.

l. Joint and combined responsibilities.

m. Sustainment priorities and resources.

n. Inter-service responsibilities.

o. Host-nation considerations.

5. Command and Signal.

   a. Command

       (1) Command Relationships. State generally the command
       relationships for the entire campaign or portions
       thereof. Indicate any shifts of command contemplated
       during the campaign, indicating time of the expected
       shift. These changes should be consistent with the
       operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give location of
       commander and command posts.

       (2) Delegation of Authority.

   b. Signal

       (1) Communications. Plans of communications. Include
       time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition,
       and identification instructions; code; liaison
       instructions; and axis of signal communications as
       appropriate.

       (2) Electronics. Plans of electronic systems. Include
       electronic policy and such other information as required.

                                        (Signed)_____
                                                         Commander

ANNEXES: As Required
DISTRIBUTION:

                        SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Appendix E

(PROPOSED)

War Termination Annex to Campaign Plan Format

ANNEX _____ War Termination Plans

References: As Applicable.

1. Political Guidance/Objectives. (From Strategic Guidance/Vision)

   a. Stated Guidance/Objectives.

   b. Implied Actions/Objectives.

2. <u>Military (Enemy)</u>

   a. Enemy Forces

       (1) Disposition of leaders/soldiers.

       (2) Disposition of weapons/weapon systems.

       (3) War Crimes Investigations.

       (4) Structure of Post-War Military Command

   b. EPWs

       (1) Compounds

            (a) Number needed/locations

            (b) Security Requirements

            (c) Medical Requirements

            (d) Food/Shelter Requirements

       (2) Transfer to Civilian Agency

            (a) Military/Civilian POCs

            (b) Transition Period (Military to Civilian)

            (c) Military/Civilian agency in charge of

       coordination

3. Civilian Population

    a. Urgent Needs

        (1) Medical Requirements

        (2) Food/Shelter Requirements

        (3) Curfew Establishment

    b. Disposition of local/state police forces

    c. Disposition of local/state political leaders

    d. Civilian Transition

        (1) Types of Agencies Needed

            (a) Humanitarian

            (b) Medical

            (c) Public Services

                1. Water

                2. Electric

                3. Communication

                4. Airport/Controllers

            (d) Military Units

        (2) Military/Civilian Control Authorities

        (3) Transition Training (if applicable)

        (4) Civilian Control Date

4. Logistics. Constructed along the lines of normal military logistics paragraph.

5. Communications. Constructed along the lines of normal military communications paragraph, with a more civilian tone.

6. Other. Factors to be considered which are not covered in previous paragraphs.

Notes

Chapter I

1. Carl von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 111.

2. B.H. Liddell Hart, <u>Strategy</u> (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 351.

3. Clausewitz, p. 87.

Chapter II

1. Clausewitz, p. 87.

2. <u>Ibid</u>, pp.605-610.

3. <u>Ibid</u>, p. 605.

4. <u>Ibid</u>, p. 605.

5. Stuart Albert and Edward C. Luck, ed., <u>On the Endings of Wars</u> (Port Washington, NY: Kennicat Press Corporation, 1980), p. 5.

6. John T. Fishel, <u>Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm</u> (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), p. VII.

7. Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, ed., <u>Conflict Termination and Military Strategy. Coercion, Persuasion, and War</u> (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 124.

8. Cimbala and Dunn, p. 124.

9. Albert and Luck, p. 5.

10. Fred C. Ikle, <u>Every War Must End</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 7-8.

11. Albert and Luck, p. 4.

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